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I. Introduction
In 2000, a small religious group from New Mexico filed a motion for preliminary injunction against the government, challenging a ban on the group's use of a hallucinogenic tea imported from Brazil.' The district court granted a preliminary injunction under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 2 The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 3 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court also affirmed, and found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in barring the group's religious use of the hallucinogen. 4 The religious group, however, also asserted an equal protection argument, claiming that the group should receive a federal exemption from the Controlled Substances Act 5 for the use and importation of their drug, similar to the peyote exemption for the Native American Church. 6 The district court wrongly rejected the equal protection claim.
Part II of this note will discuss the background of the parties involved with this issue, as well as the relevant legal authorities. Part III will summarize the case at hand on the district and appellate levels, as well as the memorandum opinion, which exclusively covers the equal protection issue. Part IV will analyze the equal protection issue and the Court's decision. Part V will conclude the note.
shamanistic based practices like UDV. 5 UDV's doctrine dictates that "members can perceive and understand God only by drinking hoasca."' 6 The importance of hoasca to UDV may be likened to the Native American Church's (NAC) reliance on peyote. Peyote, like hoasca, is cultivated primarily for its hallucinogenic properties and considered a vital religious sacrament, particularly by the NAC. 7 In fact, the NAC has also been referred to as "Peyotism" or the "Peyote religion.' ' Though not considered a "popular" drug, peyote has been the focus of much adjudication and statutory law for decades, as courts and legislators have struggled to balance many competing interests.' The various cases can be contrasted, but the parties' interests are substantially similar. Religious members who desire to partake of sacramental entheogens claim an interest in religious freedom stemming from various authorities such as the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Equal Protection Clause. 20 The government, on the other hand, claims an interest in preventing the health and safety risks imposed by the "controlled substances" used by religious groups, as well as preventing diversion of such substances, especially for non-religious use. 2 Society's interests, as always, fall on both sides of the fulcrum.
B. Relevant Authorities

The United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances 2 and the Controlled Substances Act"
The United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Convention) The preamble clearly reveals the Convention's premise: it is "concerned with the health and welfare of mankind . . ." and the "public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances., 25 The Convention characterizes specific substances through several schedules.
26
These schedules serve to categorize the drugs by their beneficial medicinal and scientific value, as well as their propensity for abuse.
27
The Convention does not independently impose itself on the world, but rather requires ratification by signatory states. 2 ' The Controlled Substances Ace 9 (CSA) represents the United States' signature to the Convention, and is essentially a domestic reflection of its international counterpart. Like the Convention, it is illegal under the CSA to "manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess.. ." a controlled substance. 3 " Also, the CSA classifies controlled substances through schedules according to each drug's degree of potential abuse and accepted medicinal or scientific value. 3
The First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... This provision comprises both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause respectively. In Abington School District v. Schempp, 33 Justice Brennan explained that "the Establishment Clause [is] a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone." 34 Despite their ideal compatibility however, the two clauses are often in tension with one another because "any time the government acts to protect free exercise of religion, its primary purpose is to advance religion.. ." but on the other hand, 24 . Convention, supra note 22. 39 Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit Oregon from applying its drug laws to ceremonial consumption of peyote, accordingly, the state could deny respondents' unemployment compensation after their employer dismissed them for using the drug. 4 '
25.
The Smith Court recognized religion as encompassing two realms, beliefs and practices, noting that although laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."' To hold otherwise, the Court found, would be to make "religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself"" 2
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 4 3
The Smith decision created a political and religious uproar. Opponents criticized the opinion for its misuse of precedent, and its lack of sensitivity toward minority religious groups, especially Native Americans." Essentially, the Smith Court stated that those seeking religious exemptions from laws 
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should use the democratic process for relief, instead of the courts. 45 Inevitably, Smith's opponents did exactly that. In 1993, Congress responded to the Smith decision by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).46 The RFRA states that its purpose is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] , and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." ' 47 Not surprisingly, various religious groups, including UDV, have invoked protection from the RFRA in order to maintain their religious practices. 48 Ultimately, the UDV cases were decided on the RFRA issue, and so likely will many similar cases in the future. However, this note will focus primarily on UDV's equal protection claim.
III. The UDV Cases
A. District Court
At the district level, the court in 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro J)49 granted UDV's request for a preliminary injunction, thus allowing the importation of hoasca. 5° The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the parties' status quo in order to maintain the last uncontested status between them until the court renders a judgment on the merits. 5 A court's broad discretion in granting preliminary injunctions is guided by four standards. 52 The party moving for preliminary injunction must show:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest. [Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/6 NOTES Additionally, if the preliminary injunction would alter the status quo relationship between the parties, the plaintiff has a heightened burden in showing that these four factors "weigh heavily and compellingly in [its] favor. ' 54 In the first district court case, UDV raised the following five issues in its motion for preliminary injunction: (1) that the federal government had infringed its rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, made applicable to federal statutes by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by selectively enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against them; (2) that the CSA's treatment of dimethyltryptamine (DMT) as a controlled substance does not extend to include hoasca; (3) that by interpreting the CSA to prohibit their use of hoasca, the government violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause by restricting their religious practice; (4) that international law required the United States government to permit ceremonial use of hoasca; and (5) that the government did not meet the heavy burden imposed on it by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to prove that the CSA's restriction on their use of hoasca furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive means. 5 5 The district court rejected the first four arguments, holding that (1) the government did not violate UDV's rights under the equal protection clause, (2) the plain language of the CSA chosen by Congress clearly covered hoasca as a controlled substance, (3) the government did not infringe UDV's rights under the First Amendment, and (4) the Convention did not override Congress' clear application of the CSA to any use of hoasca in the United States. 56 The district court, however, found that the government did not meet the heightened burden imposed by the RFRA, requiring the government to show that the CSA's restriction on UDV's "religious practices regarding hoasca furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive means.
57
B. Appellate Court
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision for the same reasons. 8 
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persuaded by UDV's first four arguments, but found that the government did not meet its heightened burden under the RFRA. 5 The court gave more consideration in determining the parties' status quo -their last uncontested status before the controversy. 60 The significance of the status quo here, is that "[ilf a preliminary injunction alters the status quo, a plaintiff must 'show that on balance, the four [preliminary injunction] factors weigh heavily and compellingly in [its] favor."' 6 ' In other words, if the status quo was the enforcement of the CSA against UDV, as the government asserts, then UDV would be seeking to alter the status quo, and thus would have a heightened burden to establish the four factors mentioned above. UDV, of course, claims that the status quo in this case should be viewed as their valid importation of hoasca before the government enforced the CSA against them. 62 According to the court, " [T] o say the enforcement of the CSA and the Convention against UDV is the status quo ignores the part played in this case by the RFRA. ' The court found that the UDV had established a prima facie case under the RFRA, to which the government conceded, and that the government's "concession buttresses the conclusion that the status quo here is not the need to enforce the CSA but rather UDV's religious practice free from a governmentally imposed burden.""
C. Equal Protection: The Memorandum Opinion
At both the district and appellate levels, UDV asserted an equal protection claim that was denied. 65 Specifically, UDV argued that the CSA is not neutral between religions because the law provides an exemption for the ceremonial use of peyote by the Native American Church (NAC)."
The court began its analysis by stating that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." ' 7 The court noted UDV's argument "relies on a comparison between the government's treatment of The government argued that UDV and the NAC are not similarly situated under equal protection analysis. 73 According to the government, one "crucial difference between [UDV's] situation and that of Native American peyote users lies in the unique relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes., 7 4 In support of this proposition, the government relied on Morton v. Mancari. 75 In Mancari, a group of non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) challenged the agency's hiring preference for Indian employees. 76 The plaintiffs asserted that this hiring preference amounted to "invidious racial discrimination., 77 The Mancari Court found that the BIA hiring preference "is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians,"' but rather "only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. 7 8 Thus, the Court characterized the preferences as political rather than racial in nature. 79 In denying the plaintiff's claim, the Mancari Court noted "the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and of "the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes." 8 The district court noted that Congress drew on the trust responsibility described in Mancari when it created the AIRFAA. 8 " In this statute, Congress found that "for many Indian people, the traditional use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures." 82 Ultimately, the court agreed with the government, and concluded that "the UDV is not similarly situated to the NAC such that the federal courts must step in to declare that the government violates Equal Protection principles by allowing an exemption only for the use of Peyote in the NAC.
' 83
IV. Analysis
The UDV and NAC are similarly situated in society such that the government violates equal protection principles by failing to afford UDV similar rights as the NAC. In its memorandum opinion, the district court relied heavily on the fact that the federal government has a unique relationship with Native American tribes. Taken too far, however, this concept has resulted in an impermissible classification on the basis of religion. The court's analysis, while not necessarily erroneous, is relatively short-sighted. UDV's motion for preliminary injunction should have been granted as to its equal protection claim.
A. The NA C and UD V: Similarities Between Time and Religion
The memorandum opinion and other cases, finding that the NAC and other religious groups are not similarly situated in society, often accentuate the differences between the Peyote Religion of the NAC and other religions, while at the same time ignoring the similarities, which are admittedly not as apparent. The memorandum opinion, as well as the authorities relied upon, implies that the Peyote Religion has stood the test of time.' For example, the opening text of the AIRFAA states that "the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way 7 the Fifth Circuit noted that the federal NAC exemption allows Native Americans to "continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use...."" It is on this point which most courts fail to sufficiently distinguish a church from a religion. While it is undoubtedly true that the use of peyote by Native American people has existed for centuries, the NAC is not yet 100 years old, as it was founded in Oklahoma in 1918. 89 The court does not mention this fact, and while it is not vital to the case, it may serve in narrowing one of the supposed differences between UDV and the NAC. UDV was founded in 1961, merely four decades after the NAC. 9° Furthermore, while various forms of the Peyote Religion, a foundation of the NAC, have existed for centuries, there is evidence that shamanistic practices, a foundation for UDV, have existed for thousands of years. 9 Additionally, the district court downplayed the similarities between religious practice and origin between the NAC and UDV. Both UDV and the Peyote Religion have roots in shamanism. 92 As discussed above, shamanism generally represents a range of traditional beliefs and practices that involve the ability to cure and diagnose human illness, control the weather, and other phenomenal powers, often achieved through the use of entheogenic substances. 93 A shaman then, is referred to as one possessing these supernatural abilities. ' However, the etymology of the word "shaman" is not strictly defined. The word was derived from the language of the Evenk people of Siberia, and by the twentieth century, was applied in North America to a wide spectrum of medicine men. 95 While many people still use the term "medicine man" to refer to the one who was a spiritual healer in Native American tribes, 85 Some writers say that "shamans" were never associated with Native American religions. 97 Arguments of this type, however, seem to center more on the etymology of the term "shaman" rather than the concept. The primary point is that in many traditional Native American cultures, there was a spiritual leader who was credited with the power to communicate with spirits, heal the sick, and other powers similar to those traditionally associated with shamans, regardless of what scholars label them. 9 " Like many traditional Native American tribes, UDV's religious practices are shamanistic in origin and character." UDV, like the NAC, uses an entheogenic substance to occasion a religious experience, and believes the substance possesses healing powers."° Thus, many courts overlook the extent of religious similarities that exists between many sects of the NAC and UDV.
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address UDV's equal protection claim, Chief Justice Roberts, in a unanimous opinion, indicated the lack of substantial, legal distinction between Indian tribes and UDV. W O ' According to the Court:
Everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca --that, as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it "has a high potential for abuse,'"'has no currently accepted medical use," and has "a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervision," -applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote. If such use is permitted in the face of the congressional findings ... for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs."°2 [Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/6 NOTES Additionally, the Court responded in a like manner to the government's assertion that its "unique relationship" with the tribes justifies its refusal to extend the exemption over a Schedule I substance to UDV.
The Government responds that there is a "unique relationship" between the United States and the Tribes, but never explains what about that "unique" relationship justifies overriding the same congressional findings on which the Government relies in resisting any exception for the UDV's religious use of hoasca. In other words, if any Schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of diversion."°3
B. NAC Membership: The Crux of the Issue
As mentioned previously, the government cited Morton v. Mancari in the memorandum to show that Congress relied on the Court's description of a "guardian-ward" status and the "unique obligation" between the United States government and Indian tribes in passing the AIRFAA.'" The Court agreed with the government that "[t]he legislative background of AIRFAA thus reflects that in enacting the statute, Congress relied on the principles outlined in Mancari."' 1 0 5 The court noted that even UDV does not dispute this."°I nstead, UDV focused its argument on the federal regulation, 7 rather than the AIRFAA.' 08 However, the court's discussion of AIRFAA and Mancari merits further analysis.
In Mancari, non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) challenged the employment preference for qualified Indians."° Concerning ' The Mancari Court found that the BIA's hiring preference "is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes."' ' . According to BIA policy, in order for an individual to be eligible for preferential treatment, he or she must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a federally recognized tribe." 2 Thus, Mancari's political classification is seemingly applicable only to Indians with at least twenty-five percent Indian blood who are also members of federally recognized tribes." 3 In other words, it is apparent that Congress would not have a unique obligation to an "Indian" who could only show that she possessed fifteen percent "Indian blood."
The term "Indian blood" seems to refer to a racial rather than political classification. The Mancari Court however, noted that "[t]he preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.. . ." " Nonetheless, in order for Mancari to apply, the individuals in question would apparently need to contain at least twenty-five percent Indian blood.
Although, in support of its argument, the government cited Mancari primarily to show that Congress relied on the Court's decision in passing the AIRFAA, rather than for the racial/political analysis, it is nonetheless worth discussing for the purpose of establishing a very important point: Not all members of the NAC have at least twenty-five percent Indian blood."
5 The court does not avoid confronting the discussion of this pivotal issue."
6 If indeed some NAC members are not legally "Indian," then § 1307.31 seems unconstitutional. In other words, if all members of the NAC qualified as "Indians," an undoubtedly protected political class toward whom the United https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/6 NOTES States government has a unique obligation, then giving the NAC an exemption from Schedule I substances appears constitutionally valid. However, if not all NAC members are legally "Indian," then the government, through § 1307.31, appears to be violating the Establishment Clause by promoting one religion over all others. In other words, the "unique obligation" justification stated in Mancari would be severely weakened when applied to the NAC, and would justify the exemption of a very similar substance in hoasca to a similarly situated religious group, UDV. Of course, if the NAC is comprised of only Native Americans, then one could scarcely argue that a small group of non-Indians from New Mexico is similarly situated to a people possessing such a unique history as Native Americans.
Furthermore, the government does not have a "unique relationship" with a politically or racially mixed church, even if that church possesses the title of "NAC." Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but would not condone such power of regulation over a church, whose congregation is decided not on political classifications, but rather on theological devotion, and other conventional standards. In essence, if the NAC has at least a noticeable number of nonIndian members, it might as well be just another church -theology aside.
Therefore, the ultimate question is whether non-Indian members, or people with less than twenty-five percent Indian blood, are allowed to join the NAC. The answer must be yes. In United States v. Boyll, the court found that "the vast majority of Native American Church congregations, like most conventional congregations, maintains an 'open door' policy and does not exclude persons on the basis of their race."
' I "As a result, non-Indian members are accepted within the [NAC]."" ' In Boyll, a long-time, nonIndian member of the NAC was indicted for importing peyote." 9 The court held that Mr. Boyll was indeed a member of the NAC under their common "open door" policy. 20 The court did not ignore this strong evidence, which is bolstered by affidavits of several NAC members.1 2 ' The court relied on Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh. 12 2 In Peyote Way, a non-Native American church, brought an equal protection claim similar to UDV's, challenging the is widely available and used throughout the country, while the other is consumed by roughly 130 people in the State of New Mexico. 5 
V. Conclusion
The UDV court arrived at the correct result under the RFRA, but should have also upheld UDV's valid equal protection claim. The equal protection issue is especially important because it presents another valid medium for sincere religious organizations who rely on prohibited entheogens to achieve their own religious experience. Courts have cited the unique relationship that the government has with the Indian tribes as a legitimate reason for denying other religious individuals and groups similar religious rights.' 5 ' Not only is this reasoning short-sighted, but such a standard effectively prohibits any other group, from now until eternity, from achieving the type of religious equal protection asserted by UDV. In other words, it is essentially impossible for any other socio-ethnic group to establish the type of special, historical relationship that exists between the United States government and the tribes. Thus, if all sincere religious practices involving controlled substances are swiftly prohibited, no group will ever have the time to establish their own religious entheogen in the same way that the Native Americans have established peyote, unless the government actually gives them a chance to show that they are not abusing the drug, either through consumption or distribution, but rather are relying on it for sincere religious reasons. Equal protection demands a more achievable standard, especially where religious neutrality is at stake.
